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Introduction 
 
 
Reformasi Reloaded? 
Implications of Indonesia’s 2014 Elections 
Felix Heiduk 
For the third time since the end of the authoritarian Suharto regime the Indonesian 
people have directly elected their president. The victory of Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), a 
self-made businessman from modest upbringings, has spurred hopes for a renewal 
of Indonesia’s reform (reformasi) process, which had for the most part lain dormant 
during the second term of his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (“SBY”). While 
the new government has raised high expectations for swift reforms amongst its sup-
porters, it faces a range of imminent challenges. An ailing state budget, bureaucratic 
red tape, dated infrastructure, as well as reforms in the fields of health care and edu-
cation are but some of the policy fields that warrant quick action. The first reality 
check for Jokowi’s reform policies will be in parliament, where his coalition currently 
holds a mere 38 percent of the seats. With regard to Jokowi’s strong focus on domestic 
affairs and his lack of experience in foreign affairs, it is also to be expected that Indo-
nesia will play a less active role in the region in the next couple of years. 
 
Before his nomination as presidential can-
didate of the PDI-P (Indonesia Democratic 
Party of Struggle), Jokowi led across the 
board by a margin of up to 27 percent. So 
the extraordinarily narrow final result, 
53.15 percent for Jokowi and 46.85 percent 
for Prabowo Subianto, took many observers 
by surprise. 
The Election Campaign and 
the Results 
The results led the loser, former general 
Prabowo, to declare the election results 
illegal and to contest them before Indo-
nesia’s constitutional court. The lack of 
evidence provided by Prabowo for the 
alleged systematic fraud and vote-buying 
during the elections, however, makes an 
annulment very unlikely. The tight out-
come needs to be seen against a number 
of mistakes during the campaign. First of 
all, Jokowi’s late nomination in March 2014 
and an ill-organized campaign that was 
not geared to its prominent candidate, 
significantly reduced Jokowi’s impact on 
the parliamentary elections in April. Con-
sequently, the PDI-P, while the strongest 
party in parliament with 19 percent of the 
votes, failed to win the 25 percent required 
to field its own presidential candidate. In-
stead it had to form a coalition with other 
 Dr. Felix Heiduk ist an Associate in SWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 38 
  August 2014 
1 
 Table 
Results of Indonesia’s parliamentary 
elections, 9 April 2014 
Party Number  
of seats 
Percentage 
of votes (%) 
PDI-P  109  18.95 
PKB  49  9.04 
NasDem  39  6.72 
Hanura  16  5.26 
Jokowi-led coalition 
(total) 
 213  39.97 
Gerindra  73  11.81 
Golkar  91  14.75 
PAN  47  7.59 
PKS  40  6.79 
PPP  35  6.53 
PD  61  10.19 
Prabowo-led coalition 
(total) 
 347  57.66 
Other parties  0  2.37 
Total  560  100.00 
Source: International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, Election Guide Indonesia, http://www. 
electionguide.org/elections/id/2398/?PageSpeed= 
noscript (accessed 7 July 2014). 
parties to enable Jokowi to run for the 
presidency. Jokowi formed his coalition 
with the newly established NasDem (which 
arose out of a civil society organization), 
the moderate Islamic PKB, and the nation-
alist Hanura. Prabowo’s coalition consisted 
of his own ultra-nationalist Gerindra, 
Golkar, the PD, and three Islamic parties: 
PAN, PPP, and PKS. 
After the parliamentary elections 
Jokowi’s lead of more than 20 percent 
dropped to about 3 percent within a few 
months. Amidst a concerted smear cam-
paign launched by Prabowo, accusing 
Jokowi of being a Christian, a Communist, 
or of Chinese descent, an often unprofes-
sionally run campaign saw support for 
Jokowi halve within the space of a few 
weeks. Additionally, Jokowi’s lack of a 
clear agenda, and his diffidence towards 
Prabowo’s often strident demands, drove 
voters into his opponents’ camp. Moreover, 
Jokowi’s seemingly tame and inert style had 
many Indonesians doubt his leadership as 
well as his political experience. 
Generally the election campaign was 
dominated less by diverging agendas or 
political controversies, and more by the 
polarizing personas of the two contenders. 
On the one hand Prabowo, a former general 
from a wealthy business family with close 
ties to the Suharto regime, who campaigned 
for a return to a stronger state and a roll-
back of “messy” democratic reforms. On the 
other hand Jokowi, a self-made business-
man from a poor background who only 
entered politics after the fall of Suharto and 
is widely viewed by his supporters as a new 
type of a “clean” politician close to the 
people. 
Because of the stark contrasts between 
the two candidates, the election results have 
come to symbolize a break with Indonesia’s 
traditional politics of “KKN” (Korrupsi, Kol-
lusi, Nepotisme – corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism) and the opening of Indonesian 
politics. More so, Jokowi’s victory – despite 
an election campaign which showcased 
very little difference in substance between 
the candidates – is regarded by many as the 
continuation of Indonesia’s reform process 
(reformasi). 
Jokowi’s Political Agenda 
The campaign period provides little insight 
into Jokowi’s political state of mind. Draw-
ing inferences from interviews, speeches, 
press conference remarks, and other pub-
lic communications it can be argued that 
Jokowi’s general political agenda shows 
some proximity to the ideas of Sukarno, 
founder of the Indonesian republic. In that 
vein he stressed national unity and the 
cooperation of all social groups, favored 
collectivist economic ideas, and voiced criti-
cism of Western, liberal individualism. The 
strong emphasis on national sovereignty and 
the territorial integrity of the Indonesian 
state also reflects Sukarnoist thinking. 
Jokowi’s Sukarnoism, however, is coupled 
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 with a bottom-up understanding of state-
society relations, in which national devel-
opment is driven by the people (and thus 
less by the state), which in turn accentuates 
the need for constant interaction between 
state elites and civil society. Out of this a 
number of still very general political ob-
jectives have emerged: to reduce Indo-
nesia’s dependence on foreign investments 
and locate more of the value chain in Indo-
nesia; to strengthen the military as the 
guardian of Indonesia’s territorial integrity 
and security; and to give greater emphasis 
in education to Indonesian values and reli-
gious morals in education. Jokowi differs 
from Sukarno in the path he proposes to 
achieve these objectives, emphasizing the 
need for a mental revolution amongst fel-
low Indonesians rather than calling for 
vast social transformations. Inherent to his 
revolusi mental (mental revolution) is a sharp 
critique of Indonesia’s corrupt, inefficient 
ruling class. Public servants should be free 
from any corruption, accountable, and 
hired on the basis of their expertise and 
merit, rather than their party affiliation or 
access to patronage networks. All of these 
general tenets are reflected in Jokowi’s 
nine-point-plan. 
Domestic Implications 
The two main themes of Jokowi’s election 
campaign were Indonesia pintar (smart In-
donesia) and Indonesia sehat (healthy Indo-
nesia). Given the popularity of these themes 
amongst ordinary Indonesians, and the 
experience Jokowi gained in earlier posts 
in these two policy fields, this came as little 
surprise. Indonesia pintar calls for a signifi-
cant increase in the education budget in 
order to provide all Indonesian children 
with free schooling. Furthermore, Islamic 
pesantren (boarding schools) are to receive 
increased state funding, teacher training is 
to be improved, and teachers’ salaries are 
to be raised. In a similar manner Indonesia 
sehat aims to provide universal health care 
to all citizens by modernizing hospitals and 
community health centers and providing 
free inpatient and outpatient services. 
However, the realization of both policies 
rests on the availability of funding. The new 
expenditures are to be financed by cutting 
the extraordinary high fuel subsides, which 
currently account for a quarter of the state 
budget, and by boosting the economy, which 
is showing its slowest growth rates in five 
years. Plans to boost economic growth are 
based on strengthening the manufacturing 
sector, modernizing infrastructure, and 
cutting red tape. Jokowi needs to secure 
support for his policies in parliament in 
order to facilitate rapid implementation. 
The presently adverse circumstances in 
parliament, where the coalition led by 
Prabowo currently holds almost 60 percent 
of the seats, could turn out to be a stum-
bling block for Jokowi’s reforms. Some 
efforts have been made to logroll other 
parties, especially the deeply divided Golkar 
party, into joining Jokowi’s coalition. The 
horse trading for prominent posts in the 
cabinet and bureaucracy, however, is likely 
to put his earlier commitments to non-
transactional politics to the test. It seems 
certain that Jokowi will have to accommo-
date the demands of potential new coali-
tion partners as his coalition for the time 
being holds only about 40 percent of seats 
in parliament. 
Another important factor is the relation-
ship between the president and the leader-
ship of his PDI-P party. Jokowi’s power base 
in the party has traditionally been weak. He 
showed little interest in becoming involved 
in internal politicking during his tenures 
as mayor of Solo and governor of Jakarta. 
He also has been rather detached from the 
party power center around former Indo-
nesian president and PDI-P chair Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. His rapid rise from outside 
the party ranks to president has thus earned 
him many enviers within his own party. 
His future maneuvering is therefore also 
dependent on his ability to secure ongoing 
backing by the PDI-P grandees. 
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 Foreign Policy under Jokowi 
So far Jokowi has had little experience in 
foreign affairs, and international politics 
played no significant role in the election 
campaign either. Little is known regarding 
his views on key foreign policy issues such 
as relations with China, the United States 
or Australia, or Indonesia’s role in ASEAN. 
He was also unable to define Indonesia’s 
role in the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea during a televised presidential 
debate. Bold proposals such as opening an 
Indonesian embassy in Palestine appeared 
more like pandering to voters than sound 
ideas on Indonesia’s future foreign policies. 
He has, however, made it clear that diplo-
macy and negotiations are his preferred 
approaches to solving international dis-
putes and that he does not intend to move 
away from the “million friends, zero 
enemies” paradigm established under his 
predecessor SBY. Demonstrations of pro-
tectionist credentials by both candidates 
during the election campaign, however, 
have had some investors worried. And to 
some extent such concerns appear vindi-
cated, with Jokowi favoring more protec-
tionist approaches in sectors such as 
natural resources, banking, and manufac-
turing. This could also affect aspects of 
global governance, such as climate pro-
tection, where Indonesia under Jokowi 
can be expected to be less cooperative than 
under his predecessor. 
Jokowi is a dark horse in the field of 
security and defense, too. Despite having 
no military background himself, many of 
his advisors are military hardliners. This, 
and the campaign emphasis on safeguard-
ing Indonesia’s territorial integrity, sug-
gests that Jakarta’s security and defense 
policy (especially in areas perceived to be 
of importance to territorial integrity such 
as the Papua issue) will become more con-
servative than during SBY’s tenure. Jokowi 
recently announced plans to raise the mili-
tary budget to 1.5 percent of GDP, to pur-
chase drones to improve surveillance of 
illegal fishing and logging activities, and 
to establish a national security council. 
Reformasi Reloaded? 
The election of a self-made businessman 
from a working-class background and the 
defeat of a former army general with excel-
lent connections to the wealthy elites can 
be interpreted as a sign of a gradual open-
ing of Indonesian politics. From a European 
perspective, Jokowi’s promise to revitalize 
crucial democratic reforms, rather than the 
return to the 1945 constitution envisaged 
by Prabowo, must be viewed as generally 
positive signs. Nonetheless Jokowi will not 
able to fulfil hopes for a renewal of Indo-
nesia’s reform process solely by acting as 
a “man of the people.” With strong oppo-
sition in parliament for the time being, 
Jokowi will be forced to tone down some 
of his idealistic policy objectives to make 
concessions to other parties. And unless 
the Indonesian state is able to significantly 
boost its budget a number of key reforms 
in the education and health care sectors 
will suffer from funding shortfalls. A recent 
drop in the prices of many of Indonesia’s 
export commodities, crippling fuel sub-
sidies, and endemic corruption represent 
further structural hurdles that warrant 
immediate attention. So far not much is 
known about what exactly Jokowi plans 
to do about many of these challenges. 
High expectations with regard to Indo-
nesia’s foreign policy are misplaced, too. 
Jokowi’s strong domestic agenda and em-
phasis on national sovereignty suggest that 
relations with Indonesia will not be trouble-
free either. 
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